Publishing Economics

Analyses of the Academic Journal Market in Economics

2000

Edited by Joshua Gans

Edward Elgar

Cheltenham, UK

xiv + 294

Craig Freedman, Macquarie University

 

 

A woman’s preaching is like a dog’s walking on his hinder legs. It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all -  Samuel Johnson

 

Joshua Gans has put together a starter kit for any economist with even the mildest strain of narcissism or the faintest whiff of idle curiosity. Assembled in one edited volume is a group of 15 papers which all quite carefully deal with an economist’s favourite subject, namely the economics profession. More specifically, the subject matter is limited to the all important issue of publication.

            If our knowledge of our own economics profession is limited, it is not for wont of trying. An alarming number of papers have captured every aspect of the job from teaching to research. The results have appeared in top ranking general journals as well as highly specialised publications with limited readerships. (Almost all 15 of the selected articles first saw the light in journals to which some economists would willingly sacrifice their first born in order to gain publication space.) One suspects that these papers are among the most widely read, if not highly cited, articles[1].

                        The articles themselves are divided into four categories. The first deals generally with the way the profession works, the incentives that lead economists to success or obscurity. The second focuses more on those two key gatekeepers of economic journals, editors and referees. The third looks narrowly at the decision to cooperate by means of the co-authored article. The last worries about the actual influence of specific economic journals. Ordinarily, I would find the first two topics to be of greater interest, but even the somewhat unpromising issue of co-authoring was equally rewarding. I would be hard pressed to substitute viable alternatives for the articles included in this edition.

            Unfortunately this makes Joshua Gans’ introduction all the more disappointing. For some reason, he tends to settle for glibness. This is a pity as anyone familiar with his work and ability can affirm (His co-authored articles in the volume only begin to show his versatility.) Gans’ glibness is at its most dangerous when it is coupled with an unwarranted tendency to be a bit too upbeat ( Panglossian?) about the state of the publishing process. This leads him to make some dubious judgements and a couple of outright blunders.

            He starts off by dismissing the first four papers as somehow being ‘less serious’ (ix) than those that follow.  Such a statement seems to demonstrate that he has missed the very point of Leijonhufvud’s well known satire (Life Among the Econ). Like the curious tribe of the ‘Econ’, Gans demands to see the modl before he will accord any respect to the result.

            Then when describing the Oster and Hamermesh look at age and productivity (Aging and Productivity Among Economists) he arrives at a curious (and ultimately unsustainable) conclusion. ‘Like many of the chapters in this volume, when looking for bias and discrimination in the publication process, scant evidence is forthcoming.’ (ix) A careful reading of some of the papers that follow should cast doubt on such a bold statement.

            It is widely agreed that the most important job that an editor performs is to match up a submission to the proper referee. If this is done badly or in a biased manner, the whole process becomes suspect. Bias may be difficult to detect quantitatively. Papers that an editor wishes to dismiss could  be sent to high quality referees but those with views diametrically opposite to the ideas expressed in the submission[2]. It would be similarly difficult to measure self-censorship. Authors increase the probability of publication by submitting articles that are very like those that have been published previously in a given journal. Since former authors are often used as referees, this type of inbuilt bias could exist without evidence (outside of the anecdotal variety) to support it.

            To return to Gans misstatements: He claims that Hammermesh (Facts and Myths about Refereeing) concludes, ‘monetary rewards rarely assist in speeding up the process’ (x). For those referees that intend to hand in a response, monetary incentives do work according to Hammermesh, though not for those referees who lose papers or simply fail to respond (63).

            As Gans states, Laband (Preliminary Evidence from Authors) does conclude that referees add value to papers. This though is a case where some due diligence is required. Even if we agree that Laband’s proxy for reviewer input is useful, his results merely demonstrate that reviewers’ inputs correlate with the quality of a subsequently published article. But this relationship is only significant statistically. If we use Laband’s values for the quality of the average input we discover that these comments increase the quality of a published paper (measured in citations over a five year period) by 0.25 citations a year. This is hardly anything to get excited about. From these results we might be tempted to conclude that referees tend to do almost as much harm as good without fear of contradiction. In other words, attempts to comply with the demands of referees may well lower the quality of a published paper nearly as often as it raises it.

            Reading Rebecca Blank’s paper (The Effects of Double-Blind versus Single-Blind Reviewing) the overall feeling is that Double-Blind reviewing is at least marginally preferable. Gans seems to think otherwise and also makes an outright error. ‘ ... papers from near-top institutions or non-academic institutions were more likely to be accepted when reviewing was double blind’ (x). This statement should read less likely.

            Again Gans takes a completely sunny view of the Laband and Piette’s (Favoritism versus Search for Good Papers: Empirical Evidence Regarding the Behavior of Journal Editors) findings. However, journals (even top ones) publish a number of marginal pieces (papers never cited). The authors do find that editors possibly display favoritism here, rewarding friends and colleagues or paying off some previous favor. Laband and Piette (126) surmise that this may be in the way of an implicit benefit to lure top people into the editor position in the first place.

            Lastly Gans concludes his summary of the Hudson paper (Trends in Multi-Authored Papers in Economics) ‘... this suggests the value of collaboration in economic research’ (xii). He ignores Hudson’s pointed warning at the end of the piece that  ‘... collaborative work may be undertaken under pressure for quantity rather than quality’ (166) and ‘... it is reasonable to question whether this trend has gone too far’ (167).

            I am still old-fashioned enough to always read the introduction to edited volumes. Such introductions can influence the way in which the reader perceives the rest of the articles. Consequently, I would have appreciated a bit more balanced and extensive analysis at the start by someone of such evident talent as Joshua Gans.

Academic publishing remains one of the most overworked of those self-referential veins dealing with the economics profession. This is unsurprising. Promotion, reputation, and perhaps professional self-esteem depend on writing articles that are published in refereed journals. The more prestigious the journal, the more value to be gained. Though articles analysing all aspects of the publishing process are numerous, few have pinpointed the key players in this process, the editor and the referee[3]. Evaluating the current state of the refereeing process, one is struck not by its faults and problems but by how a system so heavily dependent upon good will and volunteer labour manages to work at all. If individual economists were simple, self-interested agents, this arrangement might easily collapse.

            In this volume, Gans largely ignores potential problems stemming from a lack of accountability within the organisational structure of the academic publishing industry. These publications seem to suffer from the weaknesses that exist in common with most non-profit organisations. From a purely economic viewpoint, one would be hard pressed to argue that the incentives provided by refereed journals were functionally appropriate.

            The volume is still a valuable and much needed resource. I am less sanguine than Gans about the publication system that forms the backbone of the profession. It is ironic that economists have constructed a governance system that critically depends on duty and professional obligation. That the profession has unconsciously emphasised the values analysed in The Moral Sentiments rather than The Wealth of Nations makes for a rather good joke. Unfortunately, from an economic point of view, such a solution is less than ideal.

 

References

 

Mackie, Christopher D. (1998) Canonizing Economic Theory. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Shepherd, George B. (1994) Rejected: Leading Economists Ponder the Publication Process. Arizona: Thomas Horton and Daughters.


[1] The editor, Joshua Gans, is in fact the co-author of one paper (included in this volume as chapter 3 - How are the Mighty Fallen: Rejected Classic Articles by Leading Economists) that I would suspect has been one of the most eagerly perused and discussed papers in the last few decades.

[2]In conversation with Sherwin Rosen, University of Chicago, he clearly admitted that he would be hard pressed to accept findings that tended to demonstrate minimum wage provisions as being largely non-detrimental.

[3] There are two books which begin to tackle this subject by letting referees, editors, and journal contributors air their thoughts. See Mackie (1998) and Shepherd (1994).